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Introduction
Mitochondrial DNA diseases (mtDNA diseases) occur 
when problems within the genes of the mitochondria pre-
vent them from producing the levels of energy cells need to 
work properly. They are a group of neuromuscular diseases 
that can have mild to devastating effects. They cause, for 
example, heart and major organ failure, dementia, stroke, 
blindness, deafness, infant encephalopathy, and premature 
death (Department of Health 2014). Mitochondria are 
inherited via the maternal line (men affected by such dis-
eases do not, generally, transmit them to future genera-
tions1); and pathological mutations in the mitochondrial 
DNA can be present either in all mitochondria, referred to 
as ‘homoplasmy’, or only in some mitochondria, known as 
‘heteroplasmy’.
Recently two mitochondrial replacement techniques2 
(MRTs) have been developed in order to help women with 
mtDNA diseases to have genetically related children absent 
such conditions: maternal spindle transfer (MST) and pro-
nuclear transfer (PNT). In MST assisted reproductive 
1 Only one case of mitochondrial DNA inheritance via the paternal 
line has been documented in the academic literature (Schwartz and 
Vissing 2002).
2 Even when the name ‘mitochondrial replacement techniques’ is 
controversial I use it because it has secured a foothold within the 
academic debate, see Palacios-González (2016, p. 40). The name is 
controversial because the techniques transfer nuclear DNA and thus a 
better term would be ‘nuclear replacement techniques’. Paying atten-
tion to this fact is important in order no to mischaracterise the tech-
niques as intentionally replacing mitochondria, as Tina Rulli does: 
“MRTs replace the defective mitochondria [emphasis added] from the 
intended genetic mother’s egg with the healthy mitochondria from a 
donor woman’s egg” (Rulli 2016b, p. 2). Newson and Wrigley (2017) 
have recently proposed and defended the term ‘mitochondrial target-
ing techniques’.
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techniques are used to obtain eggs from the intending 
mother and a healthy donor. The chromosomes from the 
donor’s oocyte and the intending mother’s oocyte are then 
extracted. Whilst the donor’s chromosomes and the intend-
ing mother’s enucleated oocyte are discarded, the intending 
mother’s chromosomes are transferred to the now enucle-
ated donor’s oocyte.3 Afterwards, the reconstructed oocyte 
is fertilised in  vitro and then transferred to the intending 
mother or a surrogate (Tachibana et  al. 2009; Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics 2012).
In PNT two zygotes are created in  vitro. One of them 
is created with the intending parents’ sperm and oocyte (or 
a sperm from a donor), and the other one with a donated 
oocyte and the father’s (or donor’s) sperm. After fertilisa-
tion, and during the first 24  h, the maternal and paternal 
pronuclei are removed from both zygotes. The enucleated 
cell that was produced with the intending mother’s oocyte 
and the pronuclei that were contained in the cell produced 
with the donor’s oocyte are discarded. Subsequently, the 
intending parents’ (or donor’s and intending mother’s) 
pronuclei are transferred to the enucleated cell produced 
with the donor’s oocyte. The reconstructed zygote is then 
transferred to the intending mother or a surrogate (Craven 
et  al. 2010; Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2012). In both 
techniques the donor’s healthy mitochondria will be passed 
down via the maternal line to subsequent generations, if 
everything goes as expected.
Until now most of the academic literature on the ethics 
of MRTs has focused on the question of whether both tech-
niques are morally permissible.4 In this paper I depart from 
this path, and instead examine whether there are moral dif-
ferences between PNT and MST. The paper focuses on this 
issue because when we have to choose between two 
options, other things being equal, we should prefer that 
which is morally superior. Additionally, mapping the moral 
differences between these techniques could help in easing 
their explicit regulation both in traditionally liberal and 
conservative jurisdictions. It can do so in that it would 
become clear how other existing laws and regulations 
would apply to these techniques, and also, which laws and 
regulations should be modified in order for both MRTs, or 
one of them, to be made explicitly legal.
In the following sections I examine three possible rea-
sons for why MST and PNT are morally distinct from each 
other. First, I examine whether there is a moral difference 
3 During the chromosome transfer there can be unintentional carryo-
ver of pathological mitochondria. The mtDNA disease could manifest 
if the pathological mitochondria carryover is substantive (Yamada 
et al. 2016).
4 For a review of the issues that have been explored in the literature 
see: ‘Ethics of mitochondrial replacement techniques: a Habermasian 
perspective’ (Palacios-González 2017a).
between them in terms of the divide between somatic inter-
ventions and germline interventions. Second, I consider 
whether they morally differ under a therapy/creation optic. 
Finally, I investigate whether they morally differ from a 
human embryo destruction point of view. I conclude, contra 
recent arguments, that regarding the first two points there 
is no moral differences between PNT and MST; and that 
regarding the third one MST is morally preferable to PNT, 
but only if we hold a gradualist account of the moral value 
of human embryos where zygotes have slight moral value.
Germline/somatic interventions
One way in which we could try to elucidate a moral dif-
ference between PNT and MST is by investigating whether 
one constitutes a germline intervention whereas the other 
is a somatic one. This is particularly relevant since both 
MRTs have been constantly criticised for being germline 
modifying techniques. For example, Marcy Darnovsky has 
asserted:
Mitochondrial-replacement procedures would consti-
tute germline modification [emphasis added]. Were 
the United Kingdom to grant a regulatory go-ahead, 
it would unilaterally cross a legal and ethical line on 
this issue that has been observed by the entire interna-
tional community. This consensus holds that genetic-
engineering tools may be applied, with appropriate 
care and safeguards, to treat an individual’s medical 
condition, but should not be used to modify gametes 
or early embryos and so manipulate the characteris-
tics of future children (Darnovsky 2013).
The difference, in biological terms, between these kinds 
of interventions is that whilst somatic interventions are not 
inheritable, germline interventions are inheritable. Accord-
ing to the mainstream ethical position somatic modifica-
tions are morally preferable to germline ones.
Essentially all observers have stated that they believe 
that it would be ethical to insert genetic material into 
a human being for the sole purpose of medically 
correcting a severe genetic defect in that patient, in 
other words, somatic cell gene therapy. Attempts to 
correct a patient’s reproductive cells (i.e., germ line 
gene therapy) or to alter or improve a ‘normal’ person 
by gene manipulation (i.e., enhancement or eugenic 
genetic engineering) are controversial areas (Ander-
son 1985, pp. 277–778).
Germline interventions are morally not to be preferred 
because their effects will be passed on (if the affected indi-
vidual reproduces and other conditions are met) to future 
generations. This means that if the intervention causes an 
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unwanted effect, for example causes the individual to be 
in extreme pain, then this effect could be passed on—this 
argument against germline interventions is precautionary 
in nature. In its recent report on MRTs the US Institute of 
Medicine gives weight to this intergenerational worry:
Concerns about the risk of heritable change and the 
effects on future generations are valid and impor-
tant [emphasis added], and both restrictions on the 
application of MRT and the collection of information 
about its effects would be crucial aspects of accept-
able policies that would have to be in place for MRT 
investigations to proceed (Institute of Medicine of the 
National Academies 2016, p. 94).
If we accept, at face value, the position that there is a 
moral difference between somatic and germline inter-
ventions then we can investigate whether there is a moral 
difference between MST and PNT in this regard. There 
is, however, no moral difference between MST and PNT 
when examined from the somatic/germline optic. This is so 
as both can be instances of germline interventions and of 
somatic interventions (Palacios-González 2016, p.  47–48; 
Institute of Medicine of the National Academies 2016, 
p. 89; Bredenoord et al. 2011, p. 100).
If we choose for female embryos, through sperm sort-
ing or preimplantation genetic diagnosis, both MST and 
PNT would be instances of germline intervention, since 
the modification would be passed on to future generations 
given that mitochondria are maternally inherited. If, alter-
natively, we choose for male embryos then both techniques 
would be instances of somatic interventions, since such 
modifications would not be passed on to future genera-
tions as mitochondria are maternally inherited. Therefore, 
we can confidently assert that there is no moral difference 
between PNT and MST from a somatic/germline optic.
Therapy/creation acts
A second way in which we might attempt to identify a 
moral difference between MST and PNT is by investigating 
whether one of them is a therapeutic act whereas the other 
is, what might be termed, a creation-related act. A thera-
peutic act is one carried out upon an existing (or merely 
determinate) individual in a medical context, and we can 
say that as a consequence of it someone can be better off 
or worse off. By creation-related act we should understand 
an act does not affect the interests or prospects of a particu-
lar (existing or future) person but instead determines (par-
tially or totally) who it is that will come to exist. Regard-
ing identity, I am here following Parfit’s origin view: “(…) 
each person has this distinctive necessary property: that of 
having grown from the particular pair of cells [emphasis 
added] from which this person in fact grew” (Parfit 1984, 
note 11, p. 352).
When having to choose between such acts in situations 
of scarce medical resources, other things being equal, ther-
apeutic acts are considered to be morally superior. This is 
so given that they make someone better off, whereas cre-
ation-related acts only bring someone into existence and 
this is a neutral action [with the exception of wrongful life 
cases (Feinberg 1986)] under a person-affecting account of 
morality. In a recent paper Anthony Wrigley et al. (2015) 
have argued that PNT is a therapeutic intervention (a ‘pre-
emptive cure’) whereas MST is a kind of selective repro-
duction: “PNT, it is argued, is a form of therapy based on 
embryo modification while MST is, instead, an instance of 
selective reproduction” (Wrigley et al. 2015, p. 631). These 
authors conclude that there are moral reasons for offering 
PNT over MST (supposing that both are equally safe, effec-
tive and cost-effective): “Thus there is a strong prima facie 
harm-avoidance rationale for offering PNT to prospective 
parents, and for those parents to accept it; one that is not 
present in the case of MST” (Wrigley et al. 2015, p. 636).
The way in which these authors defend their claim is by 
examining the mechanics of PNT and MST. When ‘the pro-
cess of MST’ (which entails the enucleation, transfer and 
reconstitution actions) is carried out there is no individual 
in relation to which the technique is applied. There is no 
individual because the process of MST occurs on unferti-
lized eggs, and hence we are lacking half of the chromo-
somes for having one (i.e. a sperm). Even more so, when 
we have the MST-egg (the MST-egg is the end-result of 
‘the process of MST’) ready for fertilisation we still do not 
know the identity of the future individual since which 
sperm will fertilise the MST-egg is contingent on a multi-
tude of factors, from when the sample is collected to how 
the sample is handled. The only case where this does not 
attain is where we have preselected a particular pair of 
gametes before MST is considered as a reproductive 
option.5 In conclusion, in ordinary cases the process of 
MST does not treat anyone, and we should regard using an 
MST-egg for a reproductive endeavour as a creation-related 
act.6
Wrigley et  al. maintain, on the other hand, that PNT 
can be a form of therapy for a particular subject. This is so 
because PNT happens when there is already an individual:
With PNT, however, the intervention happens after 
fertilization, the gametes used are unaffected, and so 
5 Although this situation is feasible it is not the standard practice in 
reproductive scenarios.
6 The case just described is structurally symmetric to other very well 
known non-identity cases, for example ‘the 14 years old girl’ case 
described by Parfit in his ‘Reasons and Persons’ (Parfit 1984, p. 358).
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the non-identity problem does not arise. This means 
that PNT is capable of benefiting or harming any 
child created in a straightforward ‘harm-to-interests’ 
sense.(Wrigley et al. 2015, p. 635)
It must be said that Wrigley et  al.’s position regarding 
‘the process of PNT’ (which also entails the enucleation, 
transfer and reconstitution actions) is correct, in that it does 
not causally affect the identity of the intending parents’ 
would be enucleated zygote.7 It does not do so because a 
particular sperm and egg had already fused prior to the pro-
cess of PNT taking place. Therefore, the intending parents’ 
unmodified-zygote can in fact be made better off or worse 
off by the process of PNT, supposing it is the case that 
‘numerical identity follows the nuclear genome’.8 In other 
words, the process of PNT can be regarded as therapeutic 
and thus the Non-Identity Claim is not satisfied by it. The 
Non-Identity Claim:
When we use technique x this causes a (numerically) 
different person to be born, i.e. someone other than 
the person who would have been born if we had not 
used technique x.
Now, an important caveat regarding Wrigley et  al.’s 
examination of PNT should be acknowledged, they do not 
take into consideration the ‘clinical decision to employ 
PNT’. This is important because the clinical decision to 
employ PNT in fact alters the timing of conception and 
thus who will be brought into existence.9
For all those reproductive scenarios where PNT is the 
chosen course of action and where the specific gametes that 
will fuse have not been preselected prior to the decision to 
employ the technique, the clinical decision to employ PNT 
causally affects which gametes will fuse. This is so because 
after opting for PNT the woman would have to go through 
assisted reproductive techniques to obtain her eggs (if she 
does not have some stored) while her partner (or a donor) 
would have to provide a sperm sample.10 This means that 
the gametes that will fuse in order for the process of PNT to 
happen would most certainly not have fused in the first 
7 For an overview of the non-identity problem see Roberts (2015). 
For an exposition of why there is no such thing as a non-identity 
problem see Boonin (2008, 2014).
8 Even when much of the MRTs literature presupposes that ‘numeri-
cal identity follows the nuclear genome’ this position has not been 
argued for.
9 This fact about PNT was first identified by Palacios-González 
(2016, note. 12 p. 46, 2017b) and Rulli (2016a).
10 This is also true of MST: the clinical decision to employ MST 
affects the timing of conception.
place if PNT had not been chosen as the course of action.11 
At this point we can conclude that both the clinical deci-
sion to employ PNT and the clinical decision to employ 
MST alter the timing of conception and thus both are crea-
tion-related acts. Thus, from a therapy/creation optic there 
is no moral difference between the clinical decision to 
employ PNT and the clinical decision to employ MST. 
Both decisions bring someone into existence that otherwise 
would not have existed.
Now, this finding shows, contra Wrigley et al.’s conclu-
sion, that there is no harm-avoidance rationale for offering 
as a reproductive option PNT over MST to women with 
mtDNA diseases who want to have genetically related chil-
dren.12 This is so because there is no individual at that 
point that would benefit from PNT, just as as there is no 
one at that point that would benefit from MST.13 The clini-
cal decision to employ MST or PNT differs from a truly 
therapeutic decision, for example the resolution to vacci-
nate a young adult whose existence is no way related to the 
vaccination programme.14
Harm and the medical practice of PNT and MST
Once we have established the former let’s look at the medi-
cal practice of both MRTs—which entails the clinical 
decision to employ MST (or PNT), the process of MST 
(or PNT) and the use of an MST-egg (or PNT-zygote). 
The clinical decision to employ MST is identity affecting 
and the use of an MST-egg is also identity affecting. This 
means that the medical practice of MST is, so to speak, 
‘doubly’ identity affecting. Therefore, in all those cases 
11 In actuality, there is no metaphysical impossibility for the same 
gametes to fuse, but the probability of that being the case is negligi-
ble.
12 This conclusion also follows, in most cases, if we hold a weak ori-
gin view, as shown by Rulli (2016b). According to the weak origin 
view the numerical identity of the individual persists as long as it is 
the same egg that that is fertilised. In other words, a change in sperm 
is not identify-affecting. This conclusion also follows because the 
clinical decision to employ PNT affects the timing of conception in a 
matter of months, and not only to days, given the time needed for the 
ovarian stimulation to take place.
13 In a paper that was published while this paper was under review, 
Tina Rulli has also pointed out that the clinical decision to employ 
PNT alters the timing of conception and thus it should not be charac-
terised as therapeutic. One issue with Rulli’s paper is that throughout 
it she fails to properly specify when she is talking about ‘the clinical 
decision to employ PNT’ and when she is talking about ‘the process 
of PNT’. For example: “But PNT does not treat an existing person or 
a person who is on its way into existence. Rather the child will exist 
just because PNT is selected to be used in her creation” (Rulli 2016b, 
p. 5).
14 I am aware that most cases can be modified to produce non-iden-
tity scenarios.
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where no pair of gametes were preselected previous to 
the decision to employ MST (which are most, if not all of 
them) the medical practice of MST cannot harm the child 
produced, since it does not make the child worse off than 
she would otherwise have been. It does not make her worse 
off than she would otherwise have been because the only 
options available are to be conceived in this way or to not 
exist at all.
For PNT things are different, the clinical decision to 
employ PNT is identity affecting but the process of PNT 
itself is not identity affecting. Thus, the medical practice of 
PNT is not ‘doubly’ identity affecting but ‘single’ identity 
affecting. This entails that even when we do not have harm-
avoidance reasons for offering as a reproductive option 
PNT over MST, once we have decided for PNT and we 
have produced an embryo, the process of PNT can make an 
individual better off or worse off. Why? Because the deci-
sion to employ X can bring Y into existence (which does 
not make Y better off or worse off), but the use of X on Y, 
once Y exists, can make Y better off or worse off than she 
would otherwise have been. For example:
Imagine that woman K is homoplasmic for a mild 
mtDNA disease and chooses to employ PNT. The clinical 
decision to employ PNT affects the timing of conception 
and brings about embryo L. If the decision to carry out 
PNT had not been made an alternative embryo, embryo M, 
would have existed. Afterwards the process of PNT is car-
ried out on embryo L. In this scenario the process of PNT 
can make L better off or worse off than she would other-
wise have been. For example, if the procedure was com-
pletely safe and effective it would make L better off than 
she would have been if the intervention did not occur, since 
absent the intervention L would have a mtDNA disease. 
Alternatively, if during the process of PNT there was 
enough mutant mtDNA carryover so for the disease to 
manifest, in addition to the procedure causing lifelong 
extreme pain, then the process of PNT would make L worse 
off than she would have been if the intervention did not 
occur, since absent the intervention L would only suffer 
from a mild mtDNA disease.15 , 16
15 Two real life cases could be as follow: L’s parents could have a 
change of heart in the last second about PNT, or there could be con-
fusion in the clinic and embryo L could be transferred to the intend-
ing mother without the process of PNT occurring. Supposing the pro-
cess of PNT is safe and effective both these scenarios would leave L 
worse off than she would otherwise have been, since the alternative 
in both cases is for the process of PNT to ensue and L not to have a 
mtDNA disease.
16 In her treatment of PNT Rulli misses this important point, for she 
only focuses on the possible benefits that the process of PNT could 
confer: “There is a trivial sense in which the child produced by PNT 
is benefited—that is, she is not harmed as she could have been had 
PNT not been used” (Rulli 2016b, p. 4).
Even when most PNT real life cases will be like the 
ones just presented, it is possible to construct a case where 
a PNT-zygote would not have been made worse off by vir-
tue of the process of PNT, even if in the end the PNT-con-
ceived individual suffers more than if she had only had the 
mtDNA disease.17 This is not to say that the process of 
MST and the process of PNT are equivalent with respect to 
non-identity concerns. What I am asserting is that because 
a counterfactual account of harm examines ‘how things 
would otherwise have been’, there are certain instances 
where the alternative would be worse than being subject to 
PNT. Imagine the following: woman N is homoplasmic for 
a mtDNA disease and she irrevocably decides that her 
embryos will only be produced in vitro and undergo PNT 
or that she will destroy them. Because she does not want 
anyone else to intervene (and possibly halt her plans), she 
has automatized all the procedure so she is capable of 
doing it all by herself. As we know by now, the clinical 
decision to employ PNT affects the timing of conception 
and, let’s suppose, embryo O is produced. Now, the process 
of PNT in this particular instance does not make O worse 
off than she would otherwise have been, even if its effects 
are worse than the mtDNA disease.18 O is not made worse 
off by the process of PNT because the only other available 
options for O is to be destroyed. In other words, in this case 
the process of PNT does not make O worse off than O 
would have been if it did not occur, because if it had not 
occurred then O would have been destroyed and this would 
have been worse for O (Boonin 2014, p. 62).
Setting aside the previous caveat regarding a counterfac-
tual account of harm and PNT, let’s conclude this section 
by restating that from a creation/therapy optic the clinical 
decision to employ PNT or MST brings someone into exist-
ence that otherwise would not have existed. Thus there is 
no harm-avoidance rationale for offering as a reproductive 
option PNT over MST to a woman with a mtDNA disease 
that wants to have a child that is genetically related to her.
PNT and MST and the Organism View
All the previous discussion on numerical identity is 
grounded on the account that ‘numerical identity follows 
the nuclear genome’. In a recent paper Liao (2017) has 
diverted from this position and has defended, following 
the Organism View, that eggs are essentially cells and that 
zygotes are essentially organisms. This means that eggs and 
zygotes: begin to exist when their capacity to regulate and 
coordinate the various life processes is there; persists as 
17 Supposing that the individual’s life is still not a wrongful one.
18 Assuming that her life is still not a wrongful one.
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long as there is ‘organismic (or cellular) continuity’, which 
is the continuing ability to regulate and coordinate the vari-
ous life processes; and ceases to exist when the capacity to 
regulate and coordinate the various life processes ceases to 
be (Liao 2017, p. 24). Human eggs’ and zygotes’ ‘organis-
mic (or cellular) continuity’ depends, among other things, 
on the correct interaction between the nucleus and the 
mitochondria. It does so given that both the mitochondria 
and the nucleus are essential to control the various life pro-
cesses: there are life processes in the mitochondria that the 
nucleus does not (at least have full) control, and there are 
life processes in the nucleus that the mitochondria does not 
(at least have full) control (Liao 2017, p. 23).
If the above is correct then both the process of PNT 
and MST alter numerical identity. They do so since when 
we carry them out the enucleation procedure disrupts the 
zygote’s (or egg’s) organismic (or cellular) continuity, and 
thus when we transfer the couple’s nuclear DNA (or intend-
ing mother’s nuclear DNA) to the enucleated cell we create 
a new being with a new organismic (or cellular) continuity. 
Under this interpretation of the Organism View the clinical 
decision to employ PNT or MST are identity affecting, per 
the same reasons presented in the previous sections, and 
both the process of PNT and MST are identity affecting. 
Therefore, the process of PNT cannot harm those created 
through it since the only options available are to be created 
in this way or to not exist at all, contrary to what it is the 
case in ‘numerical identity follows the nuclear genome’.
Embryo destruction
A third way in which we could try to identify a moral dif-
ference between PNT and MST is by examining both tech-
niques from a human embryo destruction optic. When we 
focus on this issue a clear difference between both MRTs 
becomes evident: the medical practice of PNT requires the 
destruction of an embryo, whereas the MST one only 
requires the destruction of an unfertilized egg.19 This differ-
ence has prompted some to argue that we should mainly 
focus on MST, while forgoing PNT. For example, Lucía 
Goméz-Tatay et al. have claimed:
We also believe that research efforts should not be 
divided between MST and PNT, since the latter, 
besides not presenting any advantage in terms of 
safety and efficacy, presents more ethical difficul-
ties, insurmountable for many, that must be taken into 
19 Under a ‘numerical identity follows the nuclear genome’ account 
only one embryo is destroyed, under the organism view account two 
embryos are destroyed.
account in the context of a pluralistic society (Gómez-
Tatay et al. 2016, p. 16).
It is evident that the answer to the question of whether 
there is a moral difference between MST and PNT, from a 
human embryo destruction point of view, inheres in ques-
tions about the morality of the intentional destruction of 
human embryos. Even though this is in a strict sense the 
case, I do not have the scope here to defend a particu-
lar position on this topic. Rather, I will examine whether 
there are moral differences between MST and PNT from 
the point of view of the three most common positions on 
the moral value of human embryos: the liberal position, the 
conservative position and the gradualist position.
Liberal position
Those who defend a liberal position find no moral differ-
ence between PNT and MST. Both MRTs are morally on 
a par because human embryos are not inherently valuable. 
They argue that human embryos do not posses intrinsic 
moral value because they are not persons (Warren 2002), 
they do not posses a future like ours (Sinnott-Armstrong 
1999), and their potentiality (Harris 2006) and the fact that 
they belong to the human species (Singer 2011) does not 
bestow upon them moral value. Thus, the destruction of 
early human embryos in order to carry out PNT is as mor-
ally inconsequential as the destruction of human eggs for 
carrying out MST.
Conservative position
The conservative position, on the other hand, holds that the 
human embryo possesses high intrinsic moral value (Finnis 
1973; Stone 1987). On this view, the intentional destruction 
of human embryos is tantamount to the killing of innocent 
adult human persons.20 Therefore, a woman, or couple, 
who holds this view should regard PNT as morally imper-
missible because it necessitates the intentional destruction 
of a human embryo for the benefit of another one. In PNT 
the woman, or couple, knowingly and intentionally 
instructs another person to create and then kill an early 
human embryo.21 This is equivalent to instructing and 
authorizing the killing of an innocent teenager in order to 
harvest his heart to help another teenager. Furthermore, 
even if the woman, or couple, does not destroy the embryo 
20 Here I am using person in the Lockean sense: a person is “a think-
ing intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider 
itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places” 
(Locke 1975, p. 335).
21 Here I am drawing from Green’s (2002) “Benefiting From ‘Evil’”.
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herself she is directly encouraging it through agency and 
thus she is completely morally responsible for its destruc-
tion (Green 2002).
Now, given that in the medical practice MST does not 
inherently require the destruction of human embryos it 
seems that conservatives would be able to morally resort to 
it.22 Therefore, we could be tempted to conclude that in 
terms of embryo destruction there is an insurmountable 
moral difference between MST and PNT. Even though the 
former seems reasonable, in what follows I will show that 
when we factor in all the present variables relating to MST 
it becomes clear that it is out of the moral reach of 
conservatives.
At this point in time MST requires the destruction of 
human embryos because it is in its development phase. In 
order to investigate whether the technique works in 
humans,23 and whether embryos develop normally after 
MST, scientists need to create human embryos for the sole 
purpose of researching onto them and afterwards those 
embryos will be discarded. This means that before MST 
moves into assisted reproduction centres many human 
embryos will be intentionally destroyed during research. As 
the US Institute of Medicine’s notes:
Any preclinical data required by regulators for con-
sideration in advance of first-in-human investigations 
[of MRTs] could increase the numbers of embryos 
created, many of which would likely not be trans-
ferred for implantation.(Institute of Medicine of the 
National Academies 2016, p. 104)
Furthermore, intentional embryo destruction in the MST 
context is not limited to the initial developmental phase, but 
would also occur if and when major changes are introduced 
in the way in which the technique is carried out. If there 
were significant improvements or variations to the tech-
nique then embryos would also be created and destroyed 
while researching the safety and efficacy of the modified 
MST technique.
Conservatives arguing for only-MST, on embryo 
destruction grounds, cannot actually endorse this tech-
nique. First, even if no agency relationship exists between 
the woman, or couple, and the destruction of human 
embryos, they would be directly encouraging their destruc-
tion through the acceptance of benefit (Green 2002, p. 
549). In this case the woman, or couple, benefits from 
what she considers as a truly morally pernicious deed and 
22 It is important to emphasise that I am assuming that both tech-
niques are equally safe and effective.
23 There has been proof of principle that a human live birth is possi-
ble after MST and PNT (Zhang et al. 2016; Coghlan 2017).
her acceptance of this benefit directly encourages those 
destroying embryos to keep on doing so, even if her role in 
the overall encouragement is small. Additionally, if no calls 
for punishment and criticising of the scientists working on 
MRTs happen then they would most probably receive aca-
demic rewards (both material and psychological) for their 
work and the encouragement to keep on doing research that 
includes embryo destruction. If conservatives do not want 
to directly encourage the destruction of human embryos 
through the acceptance of benefit then they have to reject 
MST.
The second reason why conservatives cannot endorse 
MST is because they would be indirectly encouraging 
the destruction of human embryos through the legitimiza-
tion of such practice (Green 2002, p. 550). In this case we 
are not interested in how the benefits particular scientists 
could obtain would directly encourage them to do similar 
research. Rather, what we are interested in is that accepting 
the benefits of MST socially legitimises scientific practices 
that intentionally destroy human embryos. If conserva-
tives are willing to use the results of research that requires 
embryo destruction then what they are effectively saying 
is: society “may use scientific information that has been 
created by wicked research on human subjects so long as 
the information can benefit” (Green 2002, p. 550) woman 
with mtDNA diseases who want to have genetically related 
children. Given that conservatives do not want to socially 
legitimise embryo destruction practices then they have to 
reject MST.
Additionally, someone could further argue that a typical 
assisted reproduction cycle that included MST would also 
end up in the intentional destruction of human embryos. 
Because during assisted reproduction cycles many embryos 
are created and only some of those deemed healthy are 
transferred, whilst the other ones are cryopreserved or 
destroyed. The problem with this third reason is that this 
is not an essential feature of MST. Those supporting only-
MST could advocate that only two or three embryos were 
created per cycle, for example, and that all of them were 
always transferred to the intending mother or a surrogate.
At this point we can conclude that in practice at the 
present moment, for conservatives, there is no moral dif-
ference between MST and PNT in terms of the intentional 
destruction of human embryos. PNT requires the inten-
tional destruction of human embryos; and MST indirectly 
encourages the destruction of human embryos through the 
legitimization of such practice, and directly encourages the 
destruction of embryos through the acceptance of benefit. 
If conservatives do hold that human embryos possess high 





The gradualist position maintains that human embryos’ 
(and then foetuses’) moral value gradually increases as they 
develop through pregnancy (Scott 2007; Dworkin 1993). 
Thus “increasingly strong reasons are needed to try to jus-
tify the loss of fetal life” (Scott 2007, p. 2) as pregnancy 
elapses. Even when this is the case the gradualist posi-
tion also holds that “the newly conceived embryo has no 
moral value (or extremely little)” (Kaczor 2010, p. 88). If 
we accept that the human early embryo does not possess 
moral value then both PNT and MST are morally on a par 
in terms of embryo destruction, for the same reasons pre-
sented when discussing the liberal position.
If we, on the other hand, accept that human embryos 
possess very little moral value, and that it is morally per-
missible to destroy them for allowing a woman or couple 
to have a genetically related child, then we have to accept 
that MST is (slightly) morally preferable to PNT. This is 
because the total number of embryos destroyed in PNT 
would be higher than that in MST, when considering 
both clinical and research practices. Let’s remember that 
each PNT process requires the intentional destruction of 
embryos, whereas this is not the case in MST. We can con-
clude that for a gradualist who ascribes little moral value to 
human embryos the development and use of MST is mor-
ally preferable, since it minimises the destruction of some-
thing that is minimally morally valuable.
Conclusion
In this paper I have examined whether there are moral dif-
ferences between MST and PNT on three grounds: somatic/
germline, therapy/creation, and embryo destruction. 
Even though it seemed plausible to find moral differences 
between both MRTs on these three grounds, the reality is 
that the only moral difference between them is on embryo 
destruction grounds, if we hold a view that confers mini-
mal moral value to human embryos. For such gradualists, 
MST is morally preferable to PNT, because the overall 
destruction of something with moral value is minimized. A 
last word: even if my findings do not completely settle the 
question of whether there are significant moral differences 
between these techniques, they at least have shown that the 
first two grounds cannot be used in order to radically mor-
ally differentiate between PNT and MST.
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